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I.   Introduction
1 
Access to housing financing by low-income households has been an important 
issue in public policy at least since the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Mortgage 
loans to low-income households as riskier and/or costlier than housing loans to wealthier 
clients.  Financial institutions must address these challenges and still reach low-income 
clients in a profitable manner.  Typically, banks and other financial institutions attempt to 
assess the risks of housing loans by using a traditional lending technology, based on a 
consideration of loan features (namely, term to maturity, interest rate, downpayment), 
some financial characteristics of the borrower (income levels, total debt), and the value of 
property pledged as collateral.
2  
Banks, furthermore, seek to attract low-income borrowers by reducing 
downpayment and other cash contribution requirements, extending closing cost 
assistance, and accepting lower qualifying incomes and non-traditional credit histories.   
These actions do not necessarily represent genuine innovations in lending technologies 
and often are simply in response to regulatory requirements.  Standard banking practices 
do not sufficiently reduce a generalized reluctance to lend to this segment of the 
population.  Dealing with these risks more effectively will require innovative screening 
and monitoring tools. 
                                                 
1  Valentina Hartarska is Graduate Research Associate and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor and 
Director of the Rural Finance Program in the Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development 
Economics at The Ohio State University.  The views presented in this report are those of the authors and 
not necessarily those of the sponsoring organizations.   
 
2  We use the term lending technology to denote the set of criteria, steps and procedures used by a lender to 
overcome the typical information, incentive, and contract enforcement problems that constrain the 
emergence of credit transactions.  The elements of the technology allow the lender to assess the probability 
of default and to include incentives (such as collateral), among the terms and conditions of the loan 
contract, in order to encourage repayment.  When the lending technology does not closely match the   3
In recent years, financial institution have begun collaborating with third parties in 
their attempt to design a better screening mechanism for low-income mortgage loans.   
This collaboration involves the third party setting up credit counseling program to 
evaluate more precisely the optimal amount of mortgage loan that low-income household 
can sustain.  While numerous programs offer such homeownership counseling, little is 
known about their effectiveness.  Further understanding of what works and what does not 
work in this area can help focus additional attention on promising practices that increase 
access to mortgage loans by low-income households. 
Credit counseling is an innovation designed to help low-income households to 
estimate the amount of debt they can afford and thus prevent default. By learning more 
about mortgage loans, however, low-income borrowers may also learn to behave 
strategically and may prepay (refinance) their mortgages more often when the interest 
rates fall. If that is the case, counseling may be more beneficial than previously thought. 
Costly practices, such as lower down payment, higher housing expense to income, and 
total monthly liabilities to income ratios, designed to attract low-income borrowers, may 
be less appropriate than credit counseling and lower prepayment penalties. 
An important impediment of evaluation of the effectiveness of alternative lending 
practices is the lack of agreement among researches on how to study mortgage 
termination by low-income households. The option theoretic and the choice theoretic 
approaches are the two alternative approaches to mortgage termination.  While the option 
theoretic approach has ruled the research on mortgage termination in the past two 
decades, very few studies have been successful in demonstrating that low-income 
households behave strategically when acting on their mortgage obligations. On the other 
                                                                                                                                            
features of a particular set of potential clients, these clients may be excluded from access to loans, despite   4
hand, the choice theoretic approach has dealt primarily with explaining default as a result 
of borrower heterogeneity and insolvency and does not deal with prepayment behavior. 
This paper evaluates empirically what determines low-income households 
mortgage termination and compares the effectiveness of the traditional banking screening 
mechanism to the screening as a result of a particular counseling program. Part II 
describes standard mortgage lending and lending with counseling.  Part III briefly 
reviews the relevant literature and describes the competing risks and choice theoretic 
approaches to mortgage termination.  Part IV presents the empirical analysis.   
Conclusions are offered in Part V. 
 
II.  Alternative Technologies for Lending to Low-income Households  
  Traditional banking technology relies mainly on underwriting standards to 
determine whether a potential borrower will be able to service the mortgage loan.  These 
underwriting standards require that the ratio of total (monthly) housing expense to pretax 
income does not exceed 28 percent and that the ratio of total (monthly) obligations to 
income does not exceed 36 percent.  To estimate these ratios banks engage in expensive 
and time consuming collection and verification of data on household income, liabilities 
and assets.  Most of the information on the loan application form is verifiable but some 
(for example, the value of miscellaneous assets) is not.  The lack of knowledge on low-
income households circumstances impede banks abilities to screen good borrowers and 
precisely determine the optimal level of sustainable debt.
3  
                                                                                                                                            
their underlying creditworthiness.    
3 Credit scoring, considered by many the most important innovation in mortgage lending was not used for 
the whole period for which we have data, and given the small size sample of the data, we can not use it to 
evaluate its effectiveness.   5
The Community Mortgage Loan Program  studied here was initiated by (Paul 
Taylor & Associates Community Development Consulting, Huntington Bank, and Fannie 
Mae) in 1992.  The objective of the program was to provide cost efficient mortgage loans 
to low-income households, in a fashion profitable for the bank. 
Prior to 1995, only the bank was involved in the screening of potential borrowers.  
In 1995, the counsel provider introduced its counseling program. All potential low-
income borrowers go through a counseling process prior to their application at the bank.  
To address the specific needs of each borrower, the amount of counseling is individually 
determined.  Potential borrowers participate in group sessions, where they learn how to 
keep track of their living expenses, measure their level of debt, and calculate whether the 
expected mortgage loan can be sustainable. 
Graduation, (which is a prerequisite for loan application) is granted only to those 
participants who, given an interest rate and a loan amount, can generate zero or positive 
cash flow, based on a thorough verification and calculation of their actual living expenses 
and debt.  Loan amounts adjusted by these criteria do not always correspond to those 
resulting from the standard financial ratios that banks use as a screening device.  
Granting a loan, furthermore, requires that the borrower contribute a five-percent 
downpayment.  The program combines counseling with financial assistance.  If the 
borrower cannot provide the five-percent downpayment, she is granted a consumer loan 
to make it possible.   
A potential advantage of the Community Mortgage Loan program is that the 
counsel provider is a third party, with superior knowledge of the circumstances of low-
income households (that is, the provider of counseling possesses information advantages   6
over the bank).  This expertise, combined with a conservative approach to maximum 
sustainable debt estimation, improves the chances of success of the loan.  
 
III.   Discussion of the Literature 
To study the effectiveness of the alternative lending technologies we fist estimate 
an option-based model of competing risks of mortgage termination, in a Cox proportional 
hazards context.  We then introduce the influence of trigger events. Finally, we estimate a 
simple, choice theoretic model and compare the results of the two approaches.   
According to an option-based theory of mortgage termination, a borrower faces 
several choices when deciding how to act on her loan obligation.  She has the option to 
(1) make the payment on the loan and continue in good standing as a debtor, (2) pay in 
full the remaining balance on the loan, by refinancing (prepayment), or (3) surrender the 
house to the lender, in exchange for cancellation of the debt. Prepayment and default are 
just two actions that borrowers undertake in order to increase their wealth, and therefore 
are driven by the value of the underlining prepayment (call) and default (put) options 
(Foster and van Order, 1984). 
The call option is-in-the money (prepayment is profitable) when the net present 
value of the outstanding loan balance is lower at market rates than at contract rates.  The 
put option is in-the-money (default is wealth increasing) when the present value of the 
outstanding loan balance and the market is higher than the contemporaneous value of the 
house (Quigley and van Order, 1991).  Default and prepayment, from this theoretical 
perspective, are purely a financial matter.   
While earlier models of mortgage terminations have studies the prepayment and 
default options separately (Quigley and van Order, 1992, Capozza et al., 1998).  The   7
main concern of the literature was to correct for overestimation of the default hazard and 
prepayment rates by attempting to measure the transaction costs and trigger events (ref). 
A series of papers by Kau, Keen and Muller, Kau and Keenan (1996), Epperson (1992, 
1995), provide theoretical work that emphasizes the importance of the jointness of 
prepayment and default options. Most generally, the framework accounts for the fact that 
by exercising his option to default today a borrower gives up his option to default in the 
future but also his option to prepay in the future. Deng, Quigley and VanOrder (1996), 
and Deng 1997 estimate empirically the joint choices of individuals in deterministic 
competing risks model. Deng, Quigley and VanOrder (2000) also estimate competing 
risks model of mortgage termination by accounting for borrower heterogeneity. This 
empirical approach estimates prepayment and default as competing risks simultaneously, 
accounting for the fact that risks may be correlated, and for the fact that covariates may 
be time related.  
The proportional hazard model introduces by Cox (Cox and Oakes, 1984) 
provides the convenient framework for evaluating the options empirically and the 
importance of trigger events.  This approach is also ideal for dealing with time censored 
(seasoned) data.  This is critical, as empirical information is often available for only 
several years since loan origination, for loans still outstanding.  
Following Deng et. al. (2000) let Tp  and Td be the discrete random variables 
representing the duration of a mortgage until it is terminated by the mortgage holder in 
the form of prepayment or default. There is no restriction on the functional form of the 
baseline hazard. The joint survivor function conditional on np, nd, r H, Y and X can be 
expressed in the following form:     8




exp( pk γ  +  pk g (r, H, Y) +  p ' β X )         (1) 




exp( dk γ  +  dk g (r, H, Y) +   d ' β X) 
where  pk g (r, H, Y) and  dk g (r, H, Y) are the time-varying functions of option –related 
variables, r and H are the relevant interest rates and property values, respectively; Y is a 
vector of other variables that will be used together with r and H to estimate the market 
values of the options empirically; X is a vector of non-option related variables that 
indicate borrower financial strength or financial risk, as well as trigger events as 
unemployment and divorce;  pk γ ,  dk γ are parameters of the baseline function that are not 
estimates empirically (nonrestricted baseline hazard) and np, nd  are unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with the hazard functions for prepayment and default. The 
model is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood Method. 
The choice theoretic approach incorporates option values commonly stressed by 
the option-based model but in a more general, consumer choice framework. In fact, 
adherents argue that the option-based model can be viewed as a nested model within the 
broader consumer choice model and can be qualified by the consumer choice paradigm. 
This approach integrates all wealth related variables. The importance of insolvency for 
default is introduced as a separate motivation for default. That is, the approach deals with 
the ability to pay, as different to the willingness to pay (strategic default) implicit in the 
option models. 
The two approaches disagree, on the role of mortgage value effect as the choice 
theoretic approach argues that it is insolvency, not changes in interest rates that trigger 
default. The option-based approach views default as a substitute for prepayment and   9
therefore, falling interest rates will create the same incentives for default and prepayment. 
The choice theoretic approach recognizes only a secondary role for the interest rates 
because they do not directly cause insolvency and because prepayment will dominate 
default as a strategy to claiming wealth gained from a drop in rates.  The choice theoretic 
approach emphasis on income and debt is consistent with widespread use of payment and 
debt-to-income rations as standard underwriting criteria. (Elmer and Seelig, 1999) 
In terms of prepayment, there are no major differences between the two 
approaches, as prepayment is not explicitly addressed by the choice theoretic approach. 
Yang  et al. (1998) found evidence about the presence of consumer-choice 
determinants of mortgage termination, mainly through the influence of household 
income.  LaCour-Little (1999) shows that borrower characteristics influence mortgage 
termination, especially when the option does not have value (that is, the option is at-the-
money, rather than in-the-money, in the terminology of option theory).  In these cases, 
other factors, different from financial calculation, influence default. 
The major difficulty in testing the choice theoretical approach is that it is not 
possible to observe household solvency in time. The role of trigger events is highly 
consistent with the role ascribed to solvency, however. Foster and van Order (1984), 
Lekkas, Quigley and van Order (1993), Quigley and van Order (1995), and Vandell 
(1998) provide evidence on the importance of trigger events and the role of transaction 
costs.   
The greater importance of ability to pay, particularly for poorer households with 
volatile incomes, provides additional reasons to study the role of income levels and 
variability and of debt-to-income ratios in establishing creditworthiness and predicting 
default.  As empirical result from option based models on mortgage termination by low-  10 
income households are mixed, critics of the option-based theory of mortgage default also 
contend that borrowers may not understand how mortgage markets function.  Counseling, 
usually introduces concepts such as the present value of money, annualized interest rates, 
and the true value of a mortgage loan.  When interest rates and property values change, 
borrowers who have undergone counseling will have a better understanding of how these 
changes affect the value of their loan obligations. Therefore, counseling may actually 
improve the predictive power of the option-based approach. 
In the next section we put both these approaches to the test. 
 
IV.  The Empirical Analysis 
The data consist of information from a random sample of 394 loan folders, drawn 
from the database of 1,338 mortgage loans, originated between 1992 and 2000, under the 
auspices of the program (Table 1 in the Statistical Annex).  Counseled loans represent 63 
percent (294 loans) and non-counseled loans 37 percent (100 loans) of the total number 
of loans in the sample.  The population includes mortgages from Florida, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia.   
Counseled and non-counseled borrowers differ in income and net assets (Table 1). 
Primary monthly income and total borrower monthly income are significantly higher for 
the counseled loans ($1,808 and $1,928 respectively) than for the non-counseled loans 
($1,657 and $1,756 respectively). Counseled borrowers also paid higher rent prior to the 
purchase and have higher housing expenses after the purchase of the house. The relative 
increase in housing expenses is not significantly different, however. 
The data suggest that non-counseled borrowers may have misrepresented their 
financial situation in order to get the mortgage loan. Non-counseled borrowers report   11 
miscellaneous assets ($18,008) that are almost twice the miscellaneous assets reported by 
counseled borrowers ($10,979). Since the value of most other itemized assets (i.e., 
deposits, car value, real estate owned, savings for retirement) must be confirmed, 
declaring higher value of miscellaneous assets increases the net worth and therefore the 
chances of getting the loan. Savings for retirement, on the other hand, are three times 
higher for the counseled borrowers than the saving of non-counseled. These results may 
suggest that non-counseled borrowers have lower degree of financial sophistication and 
made the decision to buy a house without properly evaluating their own repayment 
capacity. 
Prime housing expenses to income and total monthly obligations to income ratios 
are important because financial institutions use them heavily to screen potential 
borrowers. These ratios do not statistically differ for counseled and non-counseled 
borrowers, in spite of the fact that the difference between the total monthly obligations 
for the counseled loans ($748) and the total monthly obligations for the non-counseled 
loans ($641) is statistically significant. Counseling seem to improve the chances of 
people with past financial problems to obtain house mortgage loans. The rate of declared 
personal bankruptcy during the previous seven years is twice as high for the counseled 
(14 percent) than for non-counseled borrowers (7 percent), and the difference is 
statistically significant.  
Data associated with the financial contract show that there is no statistically 
significant difference in purchasing price of the house for the two groups ($43,840 and 
$45,834). Counseled borrowers received higher loan amount ($43,061 and $40,880 
respectively), and higher consumer loan credit to pay the down payment ($3,231 and   12 
$1,040 respectively), while the amount of real down payment – cash from the borrower - 
was practically the same for the two groups. 
The data are observed at specific points in time, and since the mortgage loans are 
for 30 years, all observations are truncated.  Repayment records in the sample expand up 
to nine years, with most loans still outstanding (Table 2).  Non-parametric duration 
analysis shows that the incidence of default among non-counseled borrowers is higher 
than the incidence of default among counseled borrowers, while prepayment is higher for 
counseled borrowers.  
The key variables, according to the option theoretic approach, are those 
measuring the extent to which the put and call options are in-the-money. To establish the 
effect of counseling on default, the current mortgage (Fannie Mae 30years) interest rate 
and the initial contract terms are sufficient. The “Call_Option”  variable measures the 
ratio of the present discounted value of unpaid mortgage balance at current quarterly 
mortgage rate relative to the value discounted at contact interest rate (Appendix B).  
To value the put option, we need to measure the market value of each house 
quarterly and compute homeowner equity quarterly. Since we cannot observe the 
individual variations in houses in the sample, we use estimates of the means and 
variances from repeat (paired) sales provided by the Office of Federal Housing Oversight 
(OFHEO) to impute the value of the individual house prices in the sample. The variable 
“Put_Option” measures the probability that homeowner equity is negative, i.e. that the 
put option is in the money (Appendix B). 
As proxies for “trigger events” we use monthly unemployment rate by county and 
the annual divorce rate by state.   13 
The variables that would affect mortgage termination according to the choice 
theoretic approach are Income (total household monthly income), Housing Expense to 
Income Ratio, and Downpayment.  
The results regarding the effectiveness of alternative lending mechanisms vary 
depending on the approach used. Default and prepayment hazard rates, estimated in a 
competing risks framework, as prescribed by the option are shown in Table 4, Model 1. 
According to these results, mortgage termination by low-income households is not driven 
by the value of the put option but only by the value of the call option. Moreover, 
counseling does not decrease the hazard rate of default, and therefore, may not be an 
improvement in the screening mechanisms of traditional mortgage lending. 
From an option theory perspective, these results seem disappointing. Some 
measurement error may, however, contribute to this result. The median and variance 
values that are used to impute the changes of house price in time come from housing 
price indexes computed by the Office of Federal Housing Oversight (OFEO). The 
indexes are calculated from repeated sales of single-family, detached properties, using 
data on conventional conforming mortgage transactions obtained by Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae. These estimates of the fluctuation around the mean are much higher for 
conventional houses due to the higher degree of heterogeneity of the underlining 
population. Houses owned by low-income households are more homogeneous and their 
fluctuations around the mean vary less. Moreover, the mean values of the houses used in 
OFHEO indexes may be quite different from the values of the houses in low-income 
neighborhoods in our sample. 
The explanatory power of the competing risks model improves, however, when 
variables that account for the trigger events are included. Surprisingly, it is divorce, not   14 
unemployment that seems to influence default and in unexpected direction - for each one 
1 percent increase in the national divorce rate, default hazard decrease by 0.001. 
Prepayment, on the other hand is positively affected by the local unemployment rate; as 
unemployment increases by 1 percent the prepayment hazard rate increases by 0.003 
percent. Again in Model 2 (Table 4) the put option is not significant while the 
prepayment option is. Counseling affects prepayment but not default. 
When the competing risks framework is extended to include variables that capture 
borrower heterogeneity at time of loan origination (Model 3), the explanatory power of 
the model increases even further. Default hazard again is not affected by the value of the 
value of the put option but it is affected by the divorce rate, income and housing expense 
to income ratios. Here again counseling does not affect default but affects prepayment. If 
default and prepayment are interdependent risks, then the influence of counseling is on 
prepayment, not on default. 
Estimates from consumer choice specifications, when default hazard is estimated 
independently (Table 4 ) show that counseling is only marginally effective, at 10 percent 
level of significance.  Moreover, this result is not robust.  Even with consumer choice 
specifications, counseling significantly affects prepayment. 
Our results shed some light on the theoretical debate.  Low-income borrowers 
may consider home ownership a financial investment, and act on it as predicted by the 
option-based theory of mortgage termination.  Other variables, however, such as income 
and personal circumstances also affect the borrower’s behavior, and render even more 
credibility to the consumer choice approach.   
 
V. Conclusions   15 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the efficacy of two alternative lending 
technologies – traditional banking technology and a cash-flow based counseling program 
by using innovative competing risks (option-based) and choice theoretic approaches. 
If mortgage termination by low-income households is driven by the consumer 
choice considerations, and default is not a strategic action but is driven by ability to pay, 
then the screening technology of the counsel provider is only marginally better than 
traditional banking practices. Indeed, we find evidence that the choice theoretic approach 
is an appropriate approach to study low-income households’ mortgage termination.  
The competing risks model of mortgage termination may not be out of place 
either. We find evidence that low-income households possess some degree of financial 
sophistication as they act on their call option. Limitations in data quality may be behind 
problematic explanation of default hazard within the competing risks framework. 
Although in this approach counseling does not directly affect default hazard, results still 
indicate that counseled borrowers may learn to behave more strategically and may be 
more inclined to default or prepay when the put and the call options are in-the-money.  
Overall, we find evidence to support the notion that low-income borrowers have 
some degree of financial sophistication, as they repay, default or prepay on their 
mortgages by considering the current value of their put option.  The evidence also 
suggests that borrower heterogeneity and insolvency affect mortgage termination.  While 
both approaches agree that counseling influences prepayment, the two approaches do not 
show similar results regarding default.  To clarify this ambiguity more disaggregated 
price indexes should be used but this data is currently unavailable. Therefore, the jury on 
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Table 1. Borrower and Financial Contract Characteristics 





Borrower age  37.4  35.4  0.68 
      
Monthly income (borrower)  1,756  1,928  -2.04 
      
Monthly income (family)  2,030 2,339  -3.07 
      
Income previous year   17,576  23,818  -4.22 
      
Monthly housing expense to income   0.21  0.23  -1.33 
      
Monthly total obligations to income   0.33  0.33  -0.25 
      
Rent payment prior to loan  269  309  -1.79 
      
Housing expense after mortgage  375  458  -6.64 
      
Increase in housing costs  0.8  0.5  1.10 
      
Total declared assets  28,221  19,988  2.97 
      
    Miscellaneous  18,008  10,979  3.97 
      
     Savings for retirement  2,060  6,939  -2.17 
      
Total liability (stock)  8,240 11,333  -2.48 
      
Down payment  2,439  2,606  -0.60 
      
Consumer loan and credits  1,040  3,231  -3.24 
      
Loan amount  40,880  43,061  -1.73 
      
Property value  44,914  47,538  -2.00 
      
Purchasing price  43,840  45,834  1,55 
      
* in 1992 price equivalent   20 
Table 2. Portfolio Status 
Loan Status  Non-Counseled 
    %       Number 
Counseled 
     %      Number 
Total 
     %      Number 
In  Default  17.6 18  6.1  16 10.3 34 
        
Prepaid  5.9 5 3.8  12  4.5  17 
        
Current    76.6 77 90.2  266  85.2  343 
        







Table 3. Portfolio Characteristics – Non-Parametric Duration Analysis 




Default  (Portfolio)  604,246  0.0000671 
    Counseled  312,921  0.0000485 
    Non-Counseled  291,324  0.0000871 
    
Prepayment (Portfolio)  637,115  0.0000283 
    Counseled  312,388  0.0000204 
    Non-Counseled  324,727  0.000036 
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Table 4. Estimates of Competing Risk Model 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Variables 
Default   Prepayment  Default   Prepayment  Default   Prepayment 
           
Call  Option  -0.930 -4.078  1.452 -0.519 1.138 -9.699 
  (-0.37) (-2.36)  (0.58) (-3.44) (0.62) (-2.82) 
            
Put  Option  -0.191 -0.177 -0.244 -7.027 0.281 -0.472 
  (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.44) (-1.12) (0.47) (-0.66) 
            
EQR         -0.870   
         (-0.31)  
            
Unemployment      -0.203 0.305 -0.033 0.255 
     -1.01  2.06  (-0.15)  (1.53) 
            
Divorce      -0.463 0.028 -0.495 0.067 
      -1.72 0.14 -1.68 0.31 
            
Income         0.0004  0.000 
         -2.31  -1.29 
            
Housing Expense 
 to Income       3.289  -4.371 
       2.06  -2.10 
        
Downpayment        0.001  0.000 
         0.24  -1.44 
            
Counseling  -0.317 0.530  -0.540 0.739 -0.106 0.894 
  (-0.74)  (2.16) -1.31 2.32 -0.25 3.56 
            
            
Log Likelihood  -287.15  -283.63  -223.35 
            
P>|z| 0.05  0.009  0.000 
      
   22 
Table 5. Default and Prepayment as Independent Hazards 
Variables Default  Prepayment 
    
Call Option  1.486  0.000 
 (0.48)  (-2.67) 
    
Put Option  -0.752  0.416 
 (-0.71)  (-0.59) 
    
EQR -3.964   
 (-0.93)   
    
Unemployment -0.075  1.549 
 (-0.32)  (1.19) 
    
Divorce -0.561  1.372 
 (-2.02)  (0.68) 
    
Income -0.001  0.966 
 (-2.29)  (-1.25) 
    
Housing Expense to  
Income  Ratio  3.864  
 (2.20)   
    
Downpayment 0.000  0.966 
 (2.01)  (-1.42) 
    
Counseling -0.8730  3.073 
 (-1.68)  (2.22) 
    
Log Likelihood  -144.97  -65.01 
    
P>|z| 0.015  0.0018 
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Appendix B 
 
The variables measuring the value of the put and call options are defined by the 
initial terms of the mortgage and current conditions. For fixed-rate level-payment 
mortgage i with an original amount of Oi, a mortgage rate of ri, and a monthly payment of 
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The market value Mi of property i, purchased at cost Ci at time 2i and evaluated ki 
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where the term in parentheses follows a log-normal distribution.  
 
The ratio of equity to market value, E, of the property i is 
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 (4) 
where -￿￿￿ is cumulative standard normal distribution function, and w
2 is an estimated 
variance is estimated using OHEO estimates of housing prices volatility as of the last 
quarter of 2000. 
 